Yasukuni Shrine, its effects on Politics. Japan in WW II and the role of Imperial Japanese Navy
First draft prepared on February 17, 2023.
Still under work
FIRST DRAFT:
"We hope that many worshippers will come to know the thoughts of the noble souls who gave up their lives for the country they loved"
"South Korea expressed regret Tuesday after Japanese politicians sent offerings or paid visits to a war shrine seen as a symbol of Japan's militaristic past on the anniversary of the country's surrender in World War II."
The Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 World War II Class-A war criminals with heinous crimes are honored, is a spiritual tool and symbol of Japanese militarism in Japan's wars of aggression. China firmly opposes the negative moves of some Japanese political figures on the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine and has lodged a solemn representation, Wang noted."
Where and how did we end up in this situation? Now, Yasukuni shrine was founded in 1869 for those who died fighting in the Boshin Wars that led to Meiji restoration of the Emperor of Japan.
1869 isn't too far removed from 1853. Many of those alive in 1869 would have witnessed and remembered the visit of foreigners and their large smoke emitting vessels in 1853.
Commodore Matthew Perry of United States anchored in Tokyo Bay on July 8, 1853 and Japan was compelled to open itself to the external world. With it Japan developed new domestic markets as Japanese affluent (new merchants and agricultural entrepreneurs) classes could buy. Edo, Osaka, Kyoto -major urban centers.
For US, its vessels with coal power were able to sail all the way to China and many of the whalers had depleted the fish stock closer home. Thus, access to Japan which was essential for coal/fuel resupply mid voyage.
Japanese coaling stations provided US whalers and other vessels and merchants facilities to dock more frequently in between their voyages within Western Pacific.
Japan now, open to the wider world and perhaps more widely than before, went on the path of rapid development and soon was at par with any European state.
It defeated Russia in 1905 and participated in WW I, albeit in the shadows of its western peers.
In the 1930s it was well intrenched in Korea and Manchuria and was planning on taking territories. Post Pearl Harbor, it took much of South East Asia and reached the borders of India.
In August of 1945, atomic bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki that lead to the surrender of Japan. There were the Tokyo trials
Implications on Japan's Foreign
Relations:
- Relations with
China got affected
For China Yasukuni matters
the most. China sees it as a symbol of its victimhood and the way victimhood
has worked in International Politics, it holds special meaning and functional
value for unrecognized states or states that are under foreign control. Usually
in victimhood politics the weaker power, the victim plays the weaker hand very
well and its weakness is a source of strength. For instance, entities like
Palestine have used their victimhood to hold Israel by ransom in Global
Politics, multilateral fora and UN bodies. Similarly, during the age of
colonialism many of the colonies were able to publicly shame their colonial
ruler in international fora. People’s Republic of China was for a long time a
pariah state that was not recognized by many states. While the Japanese
aggression in China during WWII enabled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to
take power has KMT was weakened by repeatedly exhausting its best troops and
using up their resources in the fight against Japan, The CCP went to fight the
civil war against the battle bruised KMT.
Also, past aggressive
action allows China to see Japan as an entity that can pose threat (as per
NCR), further Japan does participate as a coalition partner of the United
States thus China sees it as a part of grouping that might want to balance a
rising China. Chinese nationalism in post-WWII has been built up the history of
suffering against Japan with a strong anti-Japanese sentiment. While e
We must understand that
while domestic factors and actions might have consequences at the state and
international level it is not easy to plan or program these changes.
2.
Relations
with South Korea got affected
South Comfort but more
domestic in line … own constituents
3.
Relations
with Taiwan perhaps, got a boost that should China try to capture Taiwan, Japan
could be counted on to oppose China.
4.
Relations
with US and Russia also got affected
5.
Concerns
in ASEAN
6.
For most
of the other countries, it was a time to come out with a statement that
probably was something of concern to one department of the Foreign Office but
for the usual foreign policy maker it was just another day, perhaps a shorter
one.
Japan also made it a point
that for appeasing they wouldn’t be toeing the some of the lines that they have
to but there are no implications beyond the symbolic. Apart from an assertion
to independent decision-making Japan under Koizumi showed that it (Japan)
understood that it had long atoned for its deeds and it continued to do so but
this need not tie down the leadership who had every freedom to maneuver. There
was a signal to the domestic left parties that their relevance was fading that
Japan under LDP had done business with China and could continue to do so even
if they were used a s conduit by PRC to get their message across to Japanese
leadership.
NCR
many components to internal
aspects when it comes to NCR,
[I was trying to get hold
of the aspects that the academia widely agrees. upon. I have got a list.]
And within it leadership
behaviour(Koizumi), Political identities(factions but Koizumi is maverick),
domestic political regimes(LDP and Japanese Political system), Strategic
Culture(haven't figured out), Perceived lessons of the past(this shouldn't be
difficult, given past aggressions from Asian mainland), leader
perception(trying to understand this part better, especially in
Yasukuni context).
Further, Japan under
Koizumi tried to become a more normal state, one that exists in global anarchy
where there is no over empowering or overarching state. Thus, it was able to
move away from a value system imposed by post-US occupation reality. As a Neo-Classical
Realism elaborates that domestic factors can determine external behaviour and
states need not be just billiard balls reacting to external stimuli, Japan
allowed its internal cases and factors to make itself more of a billiard ball.
The damage to relations was
a mere consequence though not necessarily an unintended outcome. Japan also
understood that a rising China would not bode well for it and by clearing the
Yasukuni issue as something that just happens and poses no real dangers to
other states in the region Japan Koizumi ended up providing a precedence that
wasn’t utilized to the fullest by the next Prime Minister of Japan by the next
six prime ministers who served for more or less a year each. None visited
Yasukuni till the first amongst them Abe Shinzo was re-elected as PM in (BBC,
2013). But Abe’s visit was more carefully orchestrated bereft of bluster. In
his first term he had refused to visit on diplomatic grounds accepting the
external ramifications of a visit.
But the Koizumi visits
allowed for a muscular policy in Abe’s first term where he attempted to have a
more executive style PM Office (Kantei). There was an increase in understanding
that Japan had a contraction on China, Japan needed better relations with China
and that China would rise and engage in a hegemonic way. The second PM after
Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo had come out with an open statement to not visit
Yasukuni. We thus see a desire to move away from Koizumi stance, at least
publicly. Fukuda was seen as a friendly face in China along with Kono Yohei,
the speaker of Japanese Diet (2004-2009). Kono was also opposed Koizumi visits
to Yasukuni and had acknowledged the Japanese role in comfort women issue.
(source: https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/china-and-japan-seek-detente/)
Koizumi thus was able to
play a series of acts that enhanced the nationalistic tendencies in Japan, it
compelled China to take a stance that it might have ultimately taken on a
different pretext if not the Yasukuni one. Even though, US opposed the Yasukuni
visits, US understood that while Japan was violating certain liberal
internationalist norms, Japan was less inclined to be enmeshed with China given
that its economy and businesses had massive operation sin and with China.
During the same time Japan was able to enhance its military(SDF) and have a
more muscular foreign policy.
We might say that Koizumi’s
actions to visit Yasukuni were to enhance his visibility and stature amongst
his constituency who were his source of power. This power center, i.e. His
constituency, was politically more useful than any faction in LDP. What
previously a not so acceptable practice was normalized and made a new trend
that irrespective of domestic or foreign opposition went forth. He thus
compelled a re thinking for most Japanese politicians. The future actions thus,
would be gauged against what Koizumi had done even if it might not be seen as
something granting immediate material gains as a consequence.
Koizumi however wasn’t
merely useful for the Koizumi kids who got voted to the Diet in snap elections
he ensured before retiring. He in fact freed the future prime ministers in two
ways.
Yasukuni issue would no
longer hold down his successors. By setting something of a precedence he was
making it possible for his successors to do It with much lower taboo associated
with such visits. By not being part of any faction, he alone would be pay the
price of any negative consequence or political fallout.
One might also come to the
conclusion that he freed them from having to visit Yasukuni again and again. As
he made the practice public and well publicized. His visits were in stark
contrast to the secret move of the class 14 war criminals to Yasukuni. He
attempted to make a point that there was nothing to be ashamed of in visiting
Yasukuni and no price to paid for the deed. As it was normal there was nothing
us unusual to be associated with such an act and the others could so without
the first mover advantage. Koizumi wasn’t the first to do so either but he was
unapologetic, systematic and doing something he had explicitly stated he would.
He took all the risk associated with outcomes. Someone opposed to him might
have tried to assassinate him. If Japan’s allies would have been critical and
taken political steps to the detriment of Japan’s international standing or
economy, other members of LDP might have opposed him in larger numbers.
However, future prime
ministers may not reap any pioneer's promises as this was already done and
dusted.
—--------------------------------------------
YASUKUNI VISITS AND
IMPLICATION ON JAPAN’s RELATIONS AND CHINA
-Unique periods in a states
history, present unique opportunities, decoded through Neo Classical Realism-
Strong leadership---->
strong state.
In 2006 when Hu Jintao of
China visited the US there was a gaffe involving the ROC Anthem (source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-choreography-idUSTRE70I5GT20110120) and one of the members of the crowd heckled him.
(source: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/20/world/americas/welcome-for-chinese-leader-interrupted-by-heckler.html)
(Jiang Zemin had real power
when Hu Jiantao became president of China., akin Dick Cheney having reigns over
foreign and military policy during George W Bush. Koizumi understood you can be
a weak leader despite high office and state appearing weak and you can be
strong leader of a state with military might yet the state can appear weak if
the leader is seen as not able to wield power)
But there was almost no
repercussions on the US.
Koizumi created a strong
leader persona whose strength didn't come from his state having nuclear weapons
or a large military or internal cohesion(though Japan did have that). His
strength was the popular support and his ability to take steps that he either
believed in or stood by steadfast. There are benefits for a state if the
statesmen leading it are seen as rigid on some matters as then less attempts
might be made to counter them on those matters. Though there might be counter
effects too but for Koizumi he had some aspects regarding which he did not
compromise.
The 1995-2006 years are
also seen as the years when China Japan relations were frought with tensions
(source: RC Bush
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_china_japan_bush.pdf).
Intended or not, it was
understood that China was rising and this was evident not just in how it had
come a long way in 1998 “In 1998, per capita income, though still only about
US$770, was 14 times higher than in 1980” (Source :https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/)
It was expanding its
military from post first gulf war and thus by 2000 was very large(source: DoD’s
2000 report, see graph below the 1990s saw a fall in US military spending and a
steady rise in Chinese military spending ) but also in it joining WTO on December
11, 2001.
So the gap in material had
to be taken down in political. A more prudent- practical realism could be said
to have dawned upon Japan, informed by more tangible changes and practical
concerns of politicians and people who they claim to represent. Future collisions
between economic and security involving China, Japan and the US were
evident.
When two cats wag their
tails in the same region while looking away from each other they do interact
and they do hit each other. While East Asia was the default region of overlap,
for china and Japan it wasn't just Geographical proximity but also historical
continuity.
Engaging in political
analysis of Historical events one has to be cognizant of not just what happened
for also what might have happened about could have happened. And its easier to
analyse closer to those periods than many hundred years later as many of the
factors that were live are either still active or their effects are still felt.
Thus one can be more cognizant towards those parameters. This also happens to
be one of the things that we are attempting in this thesis.
As consequence of earlier
Yasukuni visits by Japanese PM or Koizumi’s China didn't take any massive steps
to push back or kick out Japanese companies from the mainland. The events did
show that China held power over Japan in some aspects because of their mutually
advantageous symbiotic relation. Of Course today with the knowledge in
hindsight we do see the cooling of relationship later during Abe years and more
as Joe Biden administration in US continued the policy steps taken by Trump
administration during Xi years.
The Hu Jintao
years(2003-2013 or 2002-2012 when he was General Secretary) where Jiang Zemin
ruled like a cloistered Japanese emperor restricted Chinese movements and China
was much weaker and more dependent on the west. Its Navy only got the upper
hand in post 2006 period.
But the post Koizumi years
marked the relative decline vis a vis China and this was evident. See graph
below. The japanese
(source: p 277, Min-Hua
Chiang, Contemporary China-Japan Relations: the Politically Driven
Economic Linkage
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12140-019-09321-x.pdf?pdf=button%20sticky, )
Even Japan was betting on
Chinese growth as we can see in Japanese investments in China. See graph below
(source: p 278, Min-Hua
Chiang, Contemporary China-Japan Relations: the Politically Driven
Economic Linkage )
Thus, Japan under Koizumi
understood that the freedom to maneuver without massive response from China was
reducing or would reduce. Further, even the actions taken were related to
domestic aspects of Japan albeit one that ruffled feathers abroad. (small period
where China was still rising and wouldn’t hamper its prospects, its stature was
still low on the order. Japan understood the order of things)
If economic considerations
determine a nation's security posture and functions it's understandable but the
same being determined by domestic political considerations leads to a system
where functions or functional aspects or demands of security have to be tackled
in different ways each time domestic factors shift. But this doesn't seemed to
have happened when it comes to China and Japan even if we are inclined to state
otherwise.
Japanese domestic politics
has been more constant than we concede.
Further, during Koizumi
years and his Yasukuni years the consequences and outcomes have been under
predictable lines. Given that things followed the expected pattern, there can
be a belief that Koizumi was probably more shrewd than we concede, this can be
blamed on his maverick image. He understood that there was a risk but his
calculations also informed him that anything that happened would be within the
realm of controllable
China even in the post
Tiananmen Era has retained its willingness to securitise Japan. This was even
more convenient as Japan for a long time was the world's second largest
economy, albeit the one plowing funds into China. This also did not deter
the Chinese willingness to access Japanese support and aid for Chinese
development.
At the state level the
interference in each other was limited to economy and cultural exchanges but as
narrow as these two may sound they affect political behaviour.
For much of world history
states could rarely affect each other's internal dynamics(geographical and
information barriers) except during war or migration. But after the 16th
century where there has been the commercial and industrial revolution we note
that things have become more broad banded as in there is a spectrum in which
one state may influence the other. The depth of this spectrum has only been
enhanced with maturity of technology and communications leading to far greater
participation by people/individuals. The geographical barriers are less
restricting today.
While the internal orders
of Japan and China, South Korea were not interrelated during the Cold War, the
perception was that any behavior in one might affect the other. But to what
extent? Post cold war era saw opening up in most countries and regions including
north east asia. This got a further boost with the access to internet.
Japanese internet access
data in graph below
source: https://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ cited as R.H. Zakon, "Hobbes' Internet
Timeline" at http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/,
Chinese internet usage data
Japanese internet usage
could be said to have picked up in 1995 and Chinese usage in 2002-2004 and it
rose after 2006 in a big way.
(Information rev. in China
was a few years behind Japan. If it was 2010, effects would have been
different. Ex. Shanghai protests against a Japanese company owned building
whose (architecture) reassembled elements associated with Japan)
This exposed the poor
people to people relations and a lack of strong foundations of a strong
relationship. The cold war had sort of frozen the relations in the political
domain as China was poorer and Japan had US military support. The 1990s changed
this balance and there were no attempts to hide this change.
Furthermore as states
become less autocratic NCR becomes more relevant. More so because scholars are
gathering more information on what might have been considered mundane in
earlier phases in human history. Today's scholars research much more and much
better about internal issues of a state.
Koizumi period was well
into Japan's internet age.
But less so in case of
China. But whether the Chinese state were to take to heart the visits to
Yasukuni by Koizumi didn't depend on the people entirely(though the people
being a factor cannot be discounted).
The real factor was the CCP
elite and the PolitBuro. For them it was important to respond in some way lest
some other faction within CCP criticise them for not standing up for the
Chinese state which had been humiliated by the actions of the class A war criminals
who were interned at Yasukuni
Political events often
influence but do not necessarily determine everything but the influence's zone
and time of action depends on external factors and sometimes just one factor.
The one factor can be a leader, a major natural catastrophe, a war or a an
economic change or a revolutionary scientific output(Ex. Alexander the great,
fall of Soviet Union, invention of bayonet, telegraph, radars, Nukes)
Koizumi thus influenced a
lot, he overplayed his hand and in some ways changed the course too by
introducing the next set of legislators called The Koizumi Children. More than
hampering Relations with China, he awoke the Japanese to the fact that Chinese
behavior won't be non belligerent for long. The Koizumi Children lost when
there was no Koizumi effect.(reference to his son and successor too)
Yasukuni visits also helped
him cover his tactical policy failures in the domestic realm and with respect
to North Korea. We must understand that on top of these the Chinese government
wasn’t very helpful to Koizumi to get back the Japanese who had been abducted
in the 1970s. (p 1 , R C Bush https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_china_japan_bush.pdf)
What are the chances that
Relations with China would have taken a very favourable turn otherwise.
In politics and war the
decision maker is always compelled to cut loses and increase gains.
Thus if you have two games
and you have as good as lost one, you are compelled to win the next if you
choose to fight the second one too. During the Cold-War As USSR withdrew from
Cuba in the September-November of 1962, how could it ask China to capitulate
Ona fight that China initiated to coincide with the Cuban crisis. But China
went ahead with it only after receiving assurances that the US wouldn't be part
of any action on the Taiwan front and gaining USSR's support to not support
India. Koizumi, having lost in the North Korean abducted case(cutting loss)
couldn't have taken a step back on Yasukuni matters, something that was well
within the Japanese domestic side and thereby under his control. More over as
he had promised the visits. But even if the North Korean abducted issue would
have gone well, he would in all probability have gone ahead with Yasukuni
visits. No one says no to the second round that is easier when you have one the
first round that was unknown. In the previous game there were two actors USSR
and China and thus there were further interests, but here Koizumi was the sole
actor and he had far greater area to maneuvre.
For Koizumi there was the
added benefit of better economic health or recovery during his years. Though
how much of it was due to his reforms can be contested. He however did bring
spending under control. (source: David Pilling, October 17 2007, https://www.ft.com/content/4e506f06-7cc3-11dc-aee2-0000779fd2ac).
Thus we could say, his
Yasukuni visits, appearance of economic recovery, increase in business activity
owing to exports and moves towards postal privatization gave an impression of a
man with a motive and leader who had grasp of the issues plaguing Japan. He
thus moved the elections closer, expecting to be re-elected and he did. With a
larger mandate of 296 seats up from 212 for LDP in September 2005. (source: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-sep-12-fg-japan12-story.html).
Not all leaders who move
elections closer get rewarded though. In 1971 under Indira Gandhi government
the elections were moved ahead of time due to a split in party and it benefited
her but in 2004 when the Atal Bihari Vajpayee moved elections closer the
results were not amenable. Thus, there are risks involved and Koizumi played
them well. Koizumi also had to thus keep on visits to win the re election. The
international actors were aware of koizumi moves and many had supported the
economic actions in his first term. In fact the Japanese industry had exported
much of its wares to China during that time despite the Yasukuni visits.
A more triumphant posing
was also essential for Japan to stand on its own strength. This would be
essential as US was busy in the War on Terror and wanted China on its side. US
for some time had been withdrawing from East Asian waters when it came to the
number of regular patrols. (data needed to validate)
Since the 1970s after the
Vietnam war, the US has been quietly and slowly withdrawing from Asian shores
and water. Since then China has seen an increase in economic heft and also
quiet creeping increase in actions that benefit it At the cost of other Asian
states. Japan was one of them. It was only in post 2007 that the US understood
or gave it away publicly that China was rising and it would have to check it.
Japan that has been much closer to China geographically and has interactions
understood this too and Koizumi more so. But whether his visits were a warning
to an increasingly belligerent China that had made it self present in South
China Sea, was eyeing Senkaku islands and continued it's rhetoric on Taiwan.
(Japan is not a fully
sovereign state, contest to become fully sovereign again. But then Taiwan is
more so. A state dependent on US that doesn’t fully diplomatically recognise it
and follows its one China Policy)
During the same time Taiwan
had its first non KMT President Chen Shuai Bian of DPP. DPP is the party of
native Taiwan identity, one that has more tendencies for a Taiwan with
Taiwanese identity
He was a pro Taiwan
independence leader but toned down the rhetoric as he neared the presidency.
He also visited the US in
2001, removed Chiang Kai shek images from many government institutions and
added the word Taiwan to the passports. He never made the one China pledge
either.
Japan under Koizumi
witnessed the changes in Western Pacific. Koizumi for one was inclined to a
Japan that could assert itself. And if a former Japanese colony could, why
couldn't Japan.
And a colony that China
claimed as it's own territory. Though the PRC had never set foot on Taiwan. But
then no Chinese government had ever been on Japan, instead Japan had as much as
colonized much of Chinese mainland, I.e. to the east of the Hu line or the
15-inch Isohyet line, China proper.
In fact before October 1978
visit of Deng Xiaoping no Chinese leader had set foot in Japan. every nation
sees itself as unique entity, an inheritor of a culture and civilisation or a
part of a larger civilisation as in the case of Europe of Middle East. For
Japan this includes its history of not having been conquered. Thus after WW II,
retaining the institution of emperor was essential part of this continued
identity. Visiting Yasukuni shrines had also become a part to some extent of a
nation building attempt that showcased historical continuity irrespective of
changing fortunes.
When Nakasone visited
Yasukuni on August 15, 1985. China protested and Japan had to back down and
even apologize as Nakasone pledged to not visit anymore during his term. The
80s were a high point in Japan-China Relations especially so because US and China
were collaborating on several security aspects to counter USSR. Japan had thus
started sending a lot of capital to China. (China was also a junior partner)
Koizumi tried to bring the
issue back to Japanese control. When a Japanese PM visits, the Chinese won't
have a say.
China crossed the 1
trillion dollar gdp mark in 1998, the trajectory was clear. See world Bank
graphs. Koizumi knew China was no longer be the puppy that merely barked but
the hound that would hunt.
Image source:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2011&locations=JP-CN&start=1995
Japanese Prime ministers
Ichiro Ozawa and Yukio Hatoyama of Democratic Party (not LDP) believed Japan
should be closer to China so as to reduce security dependence on the US.
(source: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2006/07/04/national/ozawa-kan-hatoyama-arrive-in-china-for-hu-meet/)
Between the two Ozawa was
the real boss and disciple of Tanaka, who belonged to a former faction of LDP,
till bribery claims forced Tanaka to resign.
Throughout the 90s China
gave cover to the Korean Nuclear weapon programme.
(CCP had moved away from
humiliation narrative under Mao and at the time when Lin Biao was to succeed
him, till he betrayed Mao’s confidence. Mao understood that Japanese
imperialism had defeated the KMT enemies)
Post Tiananmen events of
June 5 1989, Deng Xiaoping paused the Chinese opening up programme and instead
went on a patriotism programme where China was depicted as a victim of the
western and Japanese oppression and the 100 year humiliation. While going by
Maoist orthodoxy China has emerged out of all this and the revolution had
undone all the effects but Deng and the CCP now claimed that the effects
remained and a lot needed to be done. This patriotic or nationalistic
programmers main target ended up as Japan. US no matter what remained and
remains a sought after place for Chinese emigration. Europe is understood to
have changed but Japan still had the same emperor and his successors after the
WWII. The constitution changed, not the government, as far as Chinese
leadership of post mao era were concerned. They had reasons to believe so as
they understood that the rise of China would be resisted by others, they thus
took the initiative to corner these states ahead of time to ensure that the
time line of new contestation does not begin when China took a larger role or
its rightful place but much before. These happened after 2001 with WTO
accession(larger role) and and as far as taking the rightful place according to
CCP, that is yet to happen, Koizumi to his domestic opponents and constituents,
by not visiting Yasukuni were he to aquiescese to the Dengist claims of Hapan
being responsible for the 100 years humiliation and attacks on China, those
that had been almost forgiven under Maoist times.
As Japan was targeted in
the new urban lore, Japan was deeply in bed with China economically. South
Korea, Taiwan had already developed and China was the emerging economy where
the next installment of returns was expected from. Thus Japanese businesses continued
to invest in PRC. Given PRC was more dependent for economic benefits makes more
sense for PRC to concede than Japan who were benefiting China with investments
and economic growth.
NCR brings in the domestic
but it doesn't exclude or exempt the external, and systemic factors.
Japan had seen the third
Taiwan straits crisis of 1995-96. China was taking a turn(becoming assertive).
But the crisis demonstrated China’s lack of capabilities to stop the US
The 1995 crisis were
probably seen as a humiliation of China at the hands of mighty US. From Japan's
vantage point that might not have been the case. China was able to mount a
successful threat that compelled the arrival of an aircraft carrier and an LHD.
In 1998 US was again
getting closer to China. China understood that they were dependent on US and
how was Japan to being closer geographically to China show weakness when US its
protector and the power from far was assertive and yet was able to have good
relations within 2 years of the 3rd Taiwan strait crises.
For Japan the alliance with
US had utility but it was more of a security-military utility than political
utility. Japan could not Command the US troops or the fleet based out of
Yokosuka to shape the Maritime security scene in East Asia or compel or coerce
China. To do so would require Japan to have a lot of leverage over US.
Political leverage would have been difficult in the 1990s and early 2000s as
Japan was the second largest economy that US politicians often were habituated
to securitise against.
In 1998 US thwarted
Japanese attempts create an Asian financial alternative in the form of Asian
Monetary Fund. This would have enabled far greater fiscal control and ability
to leverage funds among the states that were to be its members . So even if the
currency was free floating, there was an additional opening and thus room to
maneuver
And Japan could thus be
able to stimulate domestic markets and shore it's currency value, thus reducing
the impact of inflation.
The Chinese Navy in the
1990s lagged behind the JMSDF(the defacto Japanese Navy) but how good is a
superior Navy that cannot pose a threat by the very definition of its name and
mandate.
Japan being the politically
weak country but militarily and economically superior state had to balance
relations with China differently. As Koizumi was a strong leader of a
notionallly strong state that had few political tools that it could assert
itself in power struggles. Thus Koizumi had to use those he could to not just
compensate for this but also to demonstrate that he was a strong leader, which
was his political plank as he had no affiliation to any of the factions of LDP.
Thus Koizumi had to use instruments in lieu of those he had but could not use.
Thus, a Japanese leader
during the 2000s had to be assertive within the small zone of maneuver
available to them.
Koizumi judged that
Yasukuni was within this zone. And with hindsight we could say he was more or
less favourably inclined to judge so.
During the early
2000s(around 2004) it was judged that China would move ahead. The same was also
demonstrated not just by military modernisation but modernisation of industry,
China about to host the Olympics soon. These were also the days that western companies
were able to operate very freely in China(FB, Google). There was a certain
amount of freedom that ultimately led to even Facebook and Google being in
China and available to the masses. The first and second decades of 21st century
were quite a contrast for foreign entities in China.
(1990-2010)China was in one
of the sweet spots in History where your ascent is preordained by your peers
and everything looked more normal than it ever would, going by western
sensibilities.
Very few wanted to upset
the dynamics though many were crying about it. Learned men like David Shambaug
and American voices like Gordon Chang were however ringing alarm bells in DC.
Michael pillsbury’s book, Destined for War(https://www.amazon.in/Destined-War-America-escape-Thucydidess/dp/1911617303)
also explains this
Japan for one, was one of
those peers that had enabled the rise of China and it's leadership understood
that but who would take upon the burden of confrontation. For Koizumi Yasukuni
was less confrontational. It was more for the domestic audience but the
external consequences that was something they were willing to go ahead with.
Everyone knew that even China for it's own good wouldn't jeopardize its new
found acceptance, where a new member of WTO and only few external investments,
it could host gala events like the Olympics. Also got Hong Kong
But the post 2000s were
also the period of massive growth in the economy. China had a lot to lose(and
still 5-8 years in their sweet spot of history, left) and the Japanese leader
perhaps, didn't mind playing ball when the upcoming, yet old adversary’s hands
were full. Why would Koizumi lose this opportunity on a domestic matter that
enhanced Japanese sovereignty in a way. He understood China had bigger fish to
fry and would not act though they may speak.
The 1998 also saw the US
giving precedence to China over Japan. The visual evidence was when President
Clinton skipped Japan on a visit to China. He even made promises to the PRC so
as to calm down Chinese nerves on the Taiwan issue. Japan was not informed nor
taken into consideration just as the US had done regarding it's recognition of
PRC as China.
During the Koizumi years
China became more assertive, too. Was it merely a function of a growing China ?
China increased it's
belligerence by sending a Type 091 Han Class attack submarine in 2004 near
Japanese Ishigaki islands near Taiwan. (source:
https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/chinas-navy-sets-record-pace-for-intrusions-into-japans-territorial-sea/#:~:text=The%20first%20such%20case%2C%20in,Ishigaki%20Island%20in%20Okinawa%20Prefecture.)
The Han Class submarines
are the oldest nuclear attack (SSN) submarines of China and oldest that were
still in service. They are seen as noisy and not of much use apart from showing
the flag and that was what China was doing in 2004, stating that it could come
close. Now incase of any Chinese-Japanese hostilities the biggest losers would
be Japanese companies and the Japanese economy that is heavily export oriented.
In 2005, Japan and the US signed the Joint statement on Taiwan Straits that
brought them strategically closer. (source: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html). (source2: https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/international/asia/china-denounces-united-statesjapan-agreement-on-taiwan.html)
Japan also had to show its
former colony of Taiwan that it was there, had a voice and could assert itself
and did not allow China to affect the domestic actions of the prime minister in
his personal capacity. How could China dictate what Koizumi did?
US policies kept Japan from
expanding its economic arms too far. Japan had aims for economic spheres that
could never materialize; this compelled Japanese leaders to engage in acts
domestically. Thus we see the large number of airports, roads to nowhere and
also some of the best infrastructure in the world in Japan.
But such stifling of
Japanese ambitions meant two things, US would be able to engage in many more
political-economic activities that Japan might have wanted and if the US
didn't then someone else might. This someone was more often than not
China.
China, we can say has done
what was perhaps fated for Japan and Japan missed the bus under US pressure.
China saw that US would allow it to expand only as long as it did not step onto
what Us considered its feet(interests). Therein we see the importance of
sovereignty and the Yasukuni visits, engagements with other countries more free
wheeling and independent policies were instruments for Japan to find a release.
In this Japan was not unique. Every state does so, but only if they have the
capabilities and the capacity.
US was unable to control
China where they had done successfully to Japan in Past. Thus, the attention
would be on China and Japan couldn’t be coerced on a much smaller issue of
Yasukuni.
Since 2000s, apart for the
expeditionary moves to Afghanistan , Iraq, the main US move has often appeared
as the power or behemoth that is trying to protect what it has, its place in
the global system. Since 2000s every US candidate from either party has made
some or the statement to the effect that they would bring back their men and
women in uniforms back home and would avoid foreign entanglement. In that
effort Obama went to the extent to get a G2 arrangement with China. Many even
went to declare victory ahead of time so as to withdraw, such as Bush.
source: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mission-accomplished-banner-could-go-on-display-at-bush-library/
Japan to US: You stooped,
couldn’t stop China and now are willing to cooperate with China. Japan had to
take a stance
Japan for one has
understood that it can't leave all the muscle components in it's security to
US, though US has a vital role in securing Japan.
The repositioning of the
Global order began in earnest in the post Asian economic crisis of 1998. The
sub prime crisis of 2008 gave it a boost. The years in between were spent by
most powers to focus on themselves. It was similar for Japan too and Koizumi
was its leader, within the party politics by not belonging to any faction he
might appear to be a bit of a Ronin but he did his best to appear as a
Robin(Hood) for the Japanese people who though voters didn't exactly determine
the moves of the factions. Koizumi was their faction. And Koizumi used
his premiership to bring forth a bunch of leaders who could have constituted a
faction of their own. They all came to power during his time towards the end of
his term as LDP head. A good number of them, however, lost the following
election when Koizumi was no longer around.
In International Politics
states are never equal. There is a difference of power, economic heft,
capabilities, internal cohesion and how foreign factors affect the domestic and
vice versa.
Japan despite being an
economic power and political lightweight had historical positioning with China
but more importantly it had under Koizumi far better economic Relations with
other states in Asia. Japan could leverage those and thus there might be less
external pressure from other Asian states when it came to Japan’s domestic
issues and even Japan’s external behaviour.
Yasukuni couldn't be
removed with all the remains of those interned but the popular opinion and
imagination of Yasukuni could be.
Japanese nation also had
the issue of cohesion as Yasukuni was a polarising matter.
Koizumi probably understood
the limitations of his power and the short term he had.
He accordingly worked to
shift the balance among the voters, his supporters. As there would be greater
polarisation the extent or the direction Koizumi couldn’t predict or control,
he could however shift the balance in favour of his core constituency. This
world have three major benefits.
Koizumi with his core
constituency could enjoy influence well into retirement
Koizumi supported
candidates would continue to reap benefits in coming years.
Japan as a state could
posture itself as more monolithic when it came matters of past. This would
allow greater freedom to take decisions that would be unpopular but needed. Ex.
Future leaders would have more leeway and leaders like Abe could strengthen the
military’s ability to act and defend Japan.
On some matters where US
and domestic constituents might have both opposed Japan now it appeared that
the domestic audience(those who oppose you) within Japan could be pacified much
more easily and more resources could be deployed to manage external entities.
This was so as in domestic politics the number of issues raised when small or
just one makes it easy for the opposition or detractors to target the incumbent
on that issue thatcher than have many issues and dilute your strength or number
of supporters with many points to oppose. This can reduce cohesion within the
opposition camp.
Japan in its place in the
International System post WWII has been ambitious but it has been less
enthusiastic. Japan could spread influence but couldn;’t do it loudly and
achieve similar ends
Japanese leaders for much
of Cold war and after have wanted a greater role for Japan that did not enjoin
them to much militarily but have been a part of US led alliance and have
contributed monetarily and from second gulf war onwards with troops present on
ground in some capacity during the larger conflict(though not the crucial
battles). Thus Us took care of security and Japan went ahead with spreading its
economic influence but with a rising China this wouldn’t happen or things
wouldn’t be the usual for Japan
Japanese leaders thus
always have additional ways to enhance the role of Japan given there is room
for much more to do. With rising China, that may place Japan lower in the
pecking order, Japan can and should move ahead to activities that enable it to
play a role commensurate with its size. It's better to begin(opposing China)
when you are still ahead of China. The Koizumi years were that period.
To act after one has been
left behind would be seen as late and reactionary for the sake of appearances.
The visits to Yasukuni had a lot of value in terms of perception and
appearances within Japan but also beyond in China and Korea. But it also had
substantial/material value. A stronger power faces much less political backlash
than a weaker one were they to part with a norm that is supposed to bind them.
In early 2000s even if there would have been any backlash, it could be linked
to that time frame as Koizumi was an outlier(though far from being an
outsider). The Japanese government in later years could always state that
visits by leaders are in personal capacity but that Koizumi did it regularly
and as part of his promises to his support base was something that was either
limited to Koizumi or could be reduced to him breaking a Japanese norm, itself.
But of course China did
rise from 2010s and thus there was no need for any of it
Koizumi through his
personal visits was setting new boundaries for interaction between Japan and
China, South Korea. North Korea for Japan was a separate issues even if they
made a noise or protested Japan knew that North Korea either didn't matter when
it came to Yasukuni or that they were doing it for the sake of doing it without
expecting any outcome.
In this game of acts, Japan
was the major player along with the US. Koizumi by going with steps was
pre-empting China by doing what Japan could do well ahead of time and thus
China was the next major actor. South Korea ended up as a not so important actor
in this game.
Further, "It is almost
certain that Koizumi intended to do it; it was neither a mistake nor a
political show. As a matter of fact, in order to soften the Asian countries’
anger sparked by the shrine visits of Japanese leaders, Japanese Chief Cabinet
Secretary Minister of State Yasuo Fukuda had studied ways of mourning its
war-dead and suggested Japan build a new place to honor the war-dead. But
Koizumi said surprisingly that new place is a new place, while the shrine is
the shrine, indicating he would visit the shrine again." source: Sun
Zhengmin, People's Daily, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Jan/53762.htm)
Thus the Chinese position
was also more nuanced than we credit them for.
As China rose and became
aggressive it was understood that there will be friction and China might lash
out thus visiting Yasukuni might according to some aggravate the sensitivities
even more. On the counter we see that as relationships deteriorate or are seen
to deteriorate the cost of actions that damage Relations tend to be lower. If
there was a chance to improve relations in the future or the future was seen to
have been less contentious the value attached to each Japanese step would been
much higher and there might have been reasons for Koizumi to not visit
Yasukuni.
By Japan not facing any
adverse effects Koizumi was vindicated in his risky behavior
If we are to have a look at
the counterfactual. What if Japanese leaders had(self imposed) a moratorium on
visiting Yasukuni.
Would it have helped
Japan's position?
With respect to China it
would have elevated Japanese guilt. Perhaps this enabled China to have a
harsher stance. It would have also enabled harsher examination of Japan by
others. Countries like Russia would have attempted to push Japan on the Kuril
islands Northern territories dispute.
and perhaps made common
cause to corner Japan Ata multilateral fora on other matters.
The visits ensured that the
focus remained on Yasukuni rather than other matters.
A moratorium would make
Japan more of the unusual state, a category from which Japan wants to love away
from.
It would also compel Taiwan
to not rely on Japan for support with respect to PRC. That would be a massive
jolt to Japanese external Relations. Taiwan, apart from Singapore, is perhaps
the Asian nation with the best relations with Japan. Taiwan is more than that
as a former colony that seeks no vengeance and is a neighbor across the Senkaku
islands that China disputes, Japan needs Taiwan more than any other state after
the USA. Japan's influence over Taiwan and it's control of Senkaku makes Japan
more useful to USA in it's dealings with China
The precedent of not
visiting Yasukuni can also be instrumentalized against Japan in the aftermath
of a conflict in East Asia(the precedent of visiting can be too) involving
Japan. Thus, setting a certain set of actions and de-associating it from any
WWII guilt is an essential part of post cold war Japan. This becomes more
important with the rise of China
The third counterfactual is
the absence of US and more so it's inaction in a conflict. Being clear about
ones internal dynamics is thus important. National cohesion would become more
important and challenging any assertion by China on a Japanese act is too.
By regularly visiting now.
Japan can remove Yasukuni visits to be used as an act during a difficult period
in the 2060s to be used to attack Japan. Say if Japanese and Chinese Navies
exchanged fire near Taiwan and some Chinese ships sank(like Moskva in Ukraine),
a visit by the Japanese PM in it's adjacent time would be instrumentalised to
delegitimise the Japanese government as a reflection of the Militaristic Japan
in early Showa Era. Just as Ukrainian military often gets entangled in poor PR
owing to the neo Nazi Azov Brigades or the presence of Banderites within the
Ukranian military and political ranks.
In politics actions have
outcomes and inactions can have consequences. When parties acquiesce to
consequences they inherently have agreed to what has happened.
If Japanese leaders stop
visiting, the inaction would have consequences and once Japan acquiesced to
those consequences, say with respect to China, then in the order of things
China would not only supercede Japan but perhaps implement an order where Japan
would not only be a lesser state with respect to USA but also to China. The
latter has been avoided till date.
Ultimately, South Korea's
primary contention is with North Korea, China's with US (albe it often
involving Taiwan). This leaves a lot of space for Japan in its external
behaviour which however might be challenged by China. USA did challenge some
economic Outreach by Japan. Thus Japan can utilise the gap of potential power
in the domestic sphere
While having an external
impact the visits to Yasukuni were in no way going to be detrimental to Japan
immediately
In the coming years, the
power asymmetry between Japan and China would increase but for China to assert
itself and be a hegemon , it will take time and by then infrequent personal
Japanese leaders' visits to Yasukuni would have become something that has happened
and China protested and didn't do much about. If China acts it would appear
that back in the day China was so weak that it couldn't even prevent a visit to
a shrine and might be seen as a failure of the Foreign Office(from Deng days
till 2017 the foreign office was poorly represented in the highest decision
making body Central Committee of Politburo of CCP). For any bureaucracy past
failings are often a blot. Thus there is an interest for them to present
Yasukuni shrine visits as much low key than they are seen as today.
Measuring power, tolerance
and magnitude of reaction is very difficult if not impossible to do in advance.
Neo-classical Realism however does guide us to the factors that could determine
the same to an extent.
There was also the issue of
aging Japan. States with older populations tend to be less confrontational.
They may cater to more Conservative attitudes but not radical or extreme ones.
The ability/appetite to take on risk is lower. (source: knoema.com/atlas/Japan/topics/Demographics/Age/Median-age-of-population%3fmode=amp)
During the Koizumi year's
Japan was still not gray. It was middle aged. And there were predictions of a
graying state.
This may not matter too
much if the population is vast or if the state is an empire. But if you have a
finite population and it is shrinking there is a short time interval for
adventuring.
At the beginning of the
Koizumi premiership the median age of Japan was 41.20 and in 2005 it was 43.
It was expected to rise and
it has risen ever since. Increasing the burden on the state and reducing the
ability of the state to be more belligerent.
To not go to war with
China, to not interact but affect. That was the kind of move Yasukuni visits
were.
Most of international acts
of US has US domestic, popular Voting audience in mind. But even if domestic
audiences were not Voting they were still there. For US terrorism became a
something to focus upon and there were discussions and agreements in multilateral
fora because 9/11 happened. It was as if international terror was born that day
because US was affected. Thus a phenomenon is seen as more important if it
affects domestic audiences more.
In Japan, Yasukuni affected
domestic audiences in two countries the most: Japan, China. Also South Korea.
If we are to sew it as a
two player game. Then in Japan there is a Voting audience and in China there is
a non-voting audience. But this compels the latter to take offense too as the
Chinese government's main plank is that voting doesn't matter as the government
still does a better job, they are thus inclined to behave as if they were voted
in and that voices matter. Thus, China takes offense.
For Japan, it was important
to show that people's aspirations matter. There is a constituency that wants
Yasukuni visits and they are not just a core voter support group. They also
hold influence on cultural products and non government organizations.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this chapter the
overarching theme is that Japan during the cold war and after it during the
koizumi years has operated in a unique political environment. We do not claim
that the scenario during the cold-war and during the Koizumi years were same.
The most important factor being the absence of USSR in North-East Asia.
For Japan, the political
atmosphere is one that is deeply affected by its location where it is
surrounded by neighbours with whom it has had an antagonistic past during the
World Wars but these are the same states with which it has cooperated
economically, provided aid and today there is a high volume cultural, academic
and free market exchange. While Japan has tried to enhance its stature in what
it perceives as Asia(East Asia, South East Asia and the Indian subcontinent),
it has retained an umbilical connection with US when it comes to International
Political decision making and Foreign Policy. Not only is American trritory
very close to Japan in the form of Guam US is present on Japanese soil on
Okinawa,
There are US air force
bases in Yokota in Central Japan near Tokyo and Misawa in the northern most
part of Honshu(source: https://www.misawa.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3030343/wild-weasels-ace-exercise-at-misawa-yokota/ ). The US Navy is present in a big way at the former
headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The 7th fleet is stationed at
Yokosuka with the US Navy Fleet Activities, a US gated military facility
occupying 568 acres(Source: https://cnrj.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/CFA-Yokosuka/ ). This used to be
the main arsenal of Imperial Japanese Navy. Its also present at Atsugi and
Sasebo(source: https://www.navifor.usff.navy.mil/Organization/Operational-Support/NCTS-Far-East-Yokosuka/About-Us/History/ ). US Army is present at Zama(source: https://home.army.mil/japan/index.php/my-fort ) and Marines are present at Iwakuni (source: https://www.mcasiwakuni.marines.mil/ )
Japanese foreign policy and
external behaviour are less of a balancing act and more on the lines of being
cognizant of the terrain and then acting in a way to enable Japanese interests
and if possible maximise gains. But the latter is a rarity.
Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits
are thus supposed to enable Japanese interests rather than maximise gains. Also
it was done to ensure that key constituents and supporters that are on board
stay onboard till the political fruits are gained for other policies such as
those for ensuring the Japanese Economy gets out of its stagflation, ensuring
privatization or those in the political realm of expanding relations in South
East Asia and with the US. As this constituency would not oppose the bigger
policy gains in other domains Koizumi Administration would be able to enact and
expand there despite opposition from the other factions and pro-China or left
leaning parties.
Neo Classical Realism
presents the International System as an arena where states are reactive in that
their actions are reactions to the existing constraints, limitations and
advantageous instances available. But the reaction could be any of the several options
available. The options or the option that gets implemented is one that is
cognisant of the realities of levels below the state. In this statement
“levels” is in reference to levels of analyses presented by Kenneth Waltz in
his Systems Approach described in his 1954 book Man, the State, and War: A
Theoretical Analysis.
Thus, at the level below
the state in Japan there is the Japanese bureaucracy, the state-society
relationship and also the politicians and the their voters(and other
constituents) and several other domestic factors and foreign factors that
affect the domestic policies and residents. We have discussed several of these
in this chapter.
In general in pre-war Japan
the bureaucracy had penetrated politics rather than the other way, the military
bureaucracy had gained the upper hand against the civilian bureaucracy in1920s
and 30s. In post war Japan while many of the powers moved to elected officials
but the bureaucracy was not re-structured (source: p 20, T J Pempel, https://www.jstor.org/stable/419570 ).
The Japanese bureaucracy
had a strong grip on many Japanese institutions in post War Japan. Their hold
however loosened on some aspects in 1970s, 1980s and even into 1990s with the
Asian Financial Crisis (source: p 71, Peter F. Drucker, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20049051 )
The Japanese population was
60% agriculture dependent in the post WWII US occupation phase. This might have
been the case in some European states around 1800. See graph below.
Source:https://ourworldindata.org/employment-in-agriculture
Today agriculture provides
around 3% of the jobs in the Japanese Economy and in the Koizumi years this was
in the 5%-4% bracket. (source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=JP )
<iframe
src="https://data.worldbank.org/share/widget?indicators=SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS&locations=JP"
width='450' height='300' frameBorder='0' scrolling="no"
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Source: Employment in
agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate) - Japan
International Labour
Organization. “ILO modelled estimates database” ILOSTAT. Accessed January 2021.
ilostat.ilo.org/data.
The Koizumi years had high
unemployment but if we look at the graph below we note that the unemployment
rate was falling nonetheless
Source: https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00151/
We thus see a period where
the faith in bureaucracy was low and the presumed belief that the political
democratically leadership was delivering to a certain extent. The political
leadership in turn was independent of factions and dependent on loyalty of voters.
This created a situation where the leader had to deliver on the visual front
and be seen as delivering so that those outcomes that were due to factors
beyond his control also be seen as accruing from his policy decisions or
guidance. Inaction is dangerous in electoral politics and is often
consequential for leaders hoping to win a second term which Koizumi succeeded
in winning.
Further a key event took
place in 1994 the change in voting and election system from single
non-transferable vote (SNTV) system of multi-member districts (MMD) to a mixed
electoral system of single-member districts (SMD) (source: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/2057891118783270 ). This was expected to reduce the LDP dominance in the
form of vote share in electoral politics and it did, as can been seen in the
graph below.
To back this up we witness
that in general LDP to which Koizumi belonged increased LDP vote share during
Koizumi years as can be seen in black dotted lines in the graph below.
Fig. Seat share of LDP in
house of representatives including nominated (Source: p 12, Michio Umeda, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1177/2057891118783270 )
Koizumi rule took place in
a general period where LDP had lower vote share but within this period till
2005 LDP vote share increased.
LDP had also had made some
changes to the intra party elections in 1989 (source: p 17, Michio Umeda, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1177/2057891118783270 ). This empowered prefecture level party members.
Koizumi in turn backed the young blood. Koizumi backed those who backed him. He
many supporters among the masses and the organisations and outfits. All of them
were not pro-Yasukuni but there were many who were and Koizumi’s promise to
visit was two fold, it targeted the pro-Yasukuni group with a iron clad promise
and to the other supporters he proved that in the old Japanese style even if he
was a new Daimyo, one without a fief(faction), he was just as loyal if not more
and would take care of his retainers. This gave him a longer than the usual
short PM tenures that preceded him. Longer tenure meant a Japanese leader with
a better grip over Japan and power.
Thus, those countries who
saw the Yasukuni issue as something in which they had a stake owing to a
history of animosity during WW II and to some extent during the cold war, saw a
a stronger Japanese leader who did not depend on factions and visited Yasukuni
every year. Further as Jervis would like us to believe that (citation p 18-19
Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.) that the national security features o a
state has a lot to do with the states leader who may not respond rationally to
a particular event. But rather than overruling his aides, Koizumi was catering
to his audiences and believers. Though Yasukuni visits were a political act not
just domestically but also with international implications they were nowhere
close to any threat threshold.
Thus, Neoclassical realism
provides great explanatory value when it comes Koizumi’s behaviour and how the
same interacts with East Asian politics but Koizumi’s acts themselves fell
short of the classical example where a leader engages in a behaviour that leads
to political consequences that make or break his state. A critique of this
statement might be that its too early to tell and the last act on it might yet
to have taken place. If a future event akin to war takes place and the roots of
the same by historians or IR scholars who use history as th frame may be traced
back to Koizumi that might lead to different understanding of the events. But
given that
Koizumi being an
experienced practitioner of politics drove the political machine that he was
riding only as fast as the driving manual might permit, he might not have
reduced the speed at a turning but given that he was able to control the
machinations to serve his domestic purpose and take care of Japan’s external
posturing he came out of it in a much better form than many world leaders.
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